

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-02 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12

MBFR-03 SAJ-01 ACDA-19 GAC-01 TRSE-00 OMB-01 EB-11

EA-11 NIC-01 NEA-10 SCA-01 RSR-01 /150 W

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R 291220 Z MAY 73

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9146

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USDEL SALT TWO II

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 6153

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR

SUBJ: SOVIET OUTLOOK ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT

1. SUMMARY: AS PREPARATIONS GO FORWARD FOR BREZHNEV' S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, IT MAY BE USEFUL TO ASSESS OUR RELATIONSHIP ONE YEAR AFTER THE MOSCOW SUMMIT AND TO EXAMINE HOW BREZHNEV MAY VIEW HIS NEGOTIATING POSITION. CLEARLY US- SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE BEGUN TO GENERATE THEIR OWN SUBSTANTIVE MOMENTUM. THE GOING, HOWEVER, MAY GET SOMEWHAT TOUGHER AS THE TWO SIDES CONFRONT ISSUES INVOLVING MAJOR, SENSITIVE AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS. BREZHNEV HAS USED CONFIDENTIAL

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DETENTE AS A STEPPING- STONE TO MOVE TO THE FORE AMONG HIS POLITBURO COLLEAGUES. THE FACT THAT HE HAS BET HIS OWN POLITICAL CAREER AND PLACE IN HISTORY ON THE SUCCESS OF HIS DETENTE POLICY-- AND NOW TAKEN PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH

THE US-- INCREASES HIS STAKE IN A SUCCESSFUL WASHINGTON SUMMIT. EXTENSIVE, FAVORABLE PRESS TREATMENT OF US REFLECTS REAL IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS, BUT IT ALSO APPEARS CONSCIOUSLY INTENDED TO COUNTER DEEP- SEATED SKEPTICISM IN DOCTRINAIRE PARTY CIRCLES CONCERNING THE PACE AND DEPTH OF THE DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP. THIS EVIDENCE OF INGRAINED RESISTANCE TO RADICAL CHANGE SUGGESTS THAT, WHILE BREZHNEV IS CERTAINLY PREPARED TO PAY A PRICE FOR A SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO THE US, THERE ARE DEFINITE LIMITS TO THE CONCESSIONS HE CAN REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO MAKE ON CONTENTIOUS ISSUES, PARTICULARLY WHERE THEY INVOLVE MATTERS OF INTERNAL CONTROLS. CURRENT SIGNS OF SOVIET HARDENING ON THE JEWISH QUESTION MAY MERELY REFLECT PRE- SUMMIT MANEUVERING RATHER THAN FORECASTING SPIRIT OF " NO CC COMPROMISE" ON THIS ISSUE, BUT THEY ARE NEVERTHELESS A BAD OMEN BOTH FOR A GOOD RECEPTION OF BREZHNEV IN THE US AND FOR PROGRESS ON THE KEY ISSUE OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF MFN AND CREDITS FOR THE USSR. WE WOULD GUESS THAT BREZHNEV FINDS WATERGATE AFFAIR DISTURBING INTRUSION OF COMESTIC POLITICS AND HAS A MUCH MORE MODEST ESTIMATE OF HIS BARGAINING POWER THAN THE US PRESS. HE HOPES TO RETURN FROM WASHINGTON WITH SOME AGREEMENTS IN HAND TO JUSTIFY ANY CONCESSIONS HE FEELS CONSTRAINED TO MAKE; BUT WHATEVER HIS REAL FEELINGS ABOUT THE VISIT HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO PORTRAY IT TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE AS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD IN US- SOVIET RELATIONS. END SUMMARY

2. US- SOVIET DIALOGUE DEEPENS-- A QUALITATIVE CHANGE HAS OCCURRED SINCE LAST MAY IN THE SCOPE AND CLIMATE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP AS IT HAS BEGUN TO GENERATE ITS OWN MOMENTUM:

A. BOTH SIDES CAN POINT TO SOLID PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING LAST YEAR' S AGREEMENTS IN A WIDE VARIETY OF AREAS (HEALTH, SCIENCE/ TECHNOLOGY, SPACE, ENVIRONMENT, AND CULTURE).

B. GROWING NUMBERS OF INFLUENTIAL OFFICIALS ON BOTH SIDES ARE BECOMING INVOLVED IN AN ONGOING DIALOGUE. THIS CONTRIBUTES TO INCREASED

SOPHISTICATION AND TO A MORE OUTWARD- LOOKING APPROACH ON PART OF SOME PAROCHIAL AND SUSPICIOUS ELEMENTS WITHIN THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY.

C. NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THE MILITARY HAVE SHOWN SOME MEASURE OF SUCCESS (INCIDENTS AT SEA, SALT), PROSPECTS THAT TALKS WILL NOW CONFIDENTIAL

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ENCOMPASS MBFR, SUGGEST THAT OTHER SENSITIVE AREAS OF OUR RELATIONS CAN NOW BE ENCOMPASSED IN AN ONGOING DIALOGUE AIMED, IN FIRST PLACE, AT REDUCING THE RISKS OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE TWO NUCLEAR SUPERPOWERS.

D. PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IS BEING ATTACHED BY SOVIET SIDE TO EXPANDING ECONOMIC RELATIONS, BUT HERE THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED MAY PROVE DECEPTIVE. DESPITE THE FLOOD OF BUSINESS VISITORS TO USSR AND TALK OF GIGANTIC DEALS (OCCIDENTAL, LNG), FUNDING OF MASSIVE TRADE IS NOT ASSURED, PARTICULARLY GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL RESISTANCE TO THE GRANTING
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 6153

6. U. S. LEVERAGE-- BREZHNEV WILL, OF COURSE, TRY TO EXPLOIT RESULTS OF VISIT TO BONN AND ANY OTHER INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS (EVIDENCE OF IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH CHINA WOULD BE PARTICULARLY WELCOME BUT UNLIKELY) TO STRENGTHEN HIS BARGAINING POSITION. HE DEMONSTRATED, HOWEVER, IN ACCEPTING SUMMIT MEETING LAST MAY DESPITE MINING OF DRV WATERS THAT IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES OCCUPIES CENTER STAGE IN HIS UNFOLDING POLITICAL- ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF ACCOMMODATION WITH OLD ADVERSARIES. HE KNOWS HE NEEDS U. S. CREDITS MORE

THAN THE U. S. NEEDS HIS BUSINESS. AS THE VISITOR, IT IS HIS TURN TO DEMONSTRATE CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENTS COMPARABLE TO THOSE PRESIDENT NIXON
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WAS ABLE TO SHOW IN MOSCOW LAST MAY. HE NEEDS NO REMINDING THAT U. S. REMAINS IN A POSITION TO FACILITATE OR TO HAMPER SOVIET EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND WESTERN EUROPE, AND THAT WESTERN EUROPE REMAINS A MORE RELIABLE ASSET FOR THE U. S. THAN EASTERN EUROPE FOR THE USSR. FINALLY, AMBASSADOR BURCE' S RECENT ARRIVAL IN PEKING WAS A QUIET REMINDER TO MOSCOW OF THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE SINO- US DIALOGUE.

7. WATERGATE-- FAR FROM WELCOMING THIS AFFAIR, REMARKS OF SOVIET CONTACTS AND HANDLING OF ISSUE IN SOVIET PRESS SUGGEST THAT MOSCOW IS DISTURBED. ISVESTIYA' S MATVEYEV TOLD POL COUNSELOR THAT TIMING COULD NOT HAVE BEEN WORSE; IT LEAVES SOVIET SIDE WONDERING WHAT DOMESTIC ATMOSPHERE WILL BE IN U. S. AT TIME OF BREZHNEV' S ARRIVAL. NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT IN TURN EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT PRESSURES ON THE PRESIDENT FROM SENATOR JACKSON AND WATERGATE MAY PUSH HIM " TO RIGHT" AND MAKE HIM MORE INFLEXIBLE AND " ANTI- COMMUNIST". BREZHNEV PROBABLY CONSIDERS WATERGATE ANOTHER CONFUSING INTRUSION, LIKE JEWISH ISSUE, OF DOMESTIC AMERICAN POLITICS INTO SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS.

HE WANTS NOTHING TO DETRACT FROM THIS HISTORIC ENCOUNTER. HE MAY ALSO ANTICIPATE THAT PRESIDENT WILL NOW CITE STRONG DOMESTIC CRITICISM WITH GREATER PLAUSIBILITY AS REASON FOR INABILITY OF U. S. SIDE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS ON CERTAIN KEY ISSUES.

8. PRE- VISIT CONCESSIONS-- IT IS PERHAPS INEVITABLE THAT AT THIS PHASE OF PREPARATORY NEGOTIATIONS, SOME SOVIET OFFICIALS CONVEY SENSE OF SUPPRESSED IRRITATION IN DISCUSSING THE SUMMIT. WITH MANY OF EASIER CONCESSIONS HAVING ALREADY BEEN MADE LAST YEAR, BUREAUCRACIES ON BOTH SIDES ARE BEING FORCED TO REAT ISSUES CLOSER TO THE BONE OF BASIC INTERESTS AND UNDER AN EVER- SHORTER TIME DEADLINE. EACH SIDE TENDS TO DIG IN ITS HEELS IN SUPPORT OF ITS ESTABLISHED POSITIONS (E. G., MARITIME AND AGRICULTURAL EXCHANGE TALKS)-- UNTIL ORDERED FROM ABOVE TO BREAK THE LOGJAM. SOVIET INTELLIGENTSIA WILL WELCOME ANY EXPANSION OF VARIOUS TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS AS PROVIDING BUREAUCRATIC JUSTIFICATION FOR TRAVEL AND FOREIGN CONTACTS, BUT BY THEMSELVES SUCH AGREEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE WELL MERCHANDIZED BY BREZHNEV TO BE ACCEPTED AS A GREAT SUCCESS. IT IS PRECISELY IN THE MORE DIFFICULT AREAS OF US- SOVIET RELATIONS THAT BREZHNEV WILL WISH TO DEMONSTRATE SOME PROGRESS-- AND WHERE DOCTRINAIRE PARTY CIRCLES WILL TEND TO DRAG THEIR FEET.

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9. SALT-- SOVIET PUBLIC WILL BE DISAPPOINTED IF THERE IS NO INDICATION OF FORWARD MOVEMENT ON THIS QUESTION. AT RECENT ARMED FORCES DAY RECEPTION, SOVIET ACADEMIC EXPERT ON STRATEGIC ARMS HINTED AT POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER INTERIM AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, BUT WE NOTICED THAT SOME SOVIET GENERALS AT SAME RECEPTION RESPONDED TO TOASTS ABOUT FORTHCOMING SUMMIT WITH WHAT SEEMED LIKE LACK OF ENTHUSIASM. BREZHNEV MAY HAVE OCCASION TO TEST WHETHER MARSHAL GRECHKO

REPRESENTS HIM ON THE POLITBURO OR THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT IN DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION.

10. MFN-- EVEN MORE SERIOUS SHADOW HANGING OVER MEETING IS FATE OF JACKSON AMENDMENT AND JEWISH ISSUE. HAVING SOLD " AMERIKA POLITIK" ON THE GROUNDS OF ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE, BREZHNEV WILL BE LOOKING AT THE SUMMIT FOR SOME CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF RETURN ON HIS INVESTMENT. INSTEAD, HE RISKS FACING A HOSTILE CONGRESS SUPPORTING THE JACKSON AMENDMENT AND ASKING HIM TO MAKE GOOD ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP PROMISES

THAT MOST JEWS WHO WISH MAY LEAVE.

11. SOVIET JEWRY-- IZVESTIYA'S MATVEYEV WARNED POL COUNSELOR LAST WEEK THAT THOSE WHO HOPED TO USE UPCOMING VISIT TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS FROM

USSR ON THIS ISSUE WERE SORELY MISTAKEN. CURRENT "NO FURTHER CONCESSION" MOOD IS DISTURBING, PARTICULARLY AGAINST BACKGROUND OF REPORTS OF INCREASED REPRESSIVE MEASURES AND EXIT REFUSALS. IF THIS MOOD HOLDS AND BREZHNEV DOES NOT ORDER THE RELEASE OF PROMINENT JEWS BEFORE HE ARRIVES IN U. S., HE RISKS SOURING ATMOSPHERE OF HIS VISIT AND ENCOURAGING UNPLEASANT DEMONSTRATIONS AND INCIDENTS. WE MAY ONLY BE SEEING PRE-SUMMIT MANEUVERING ON THIS ISSUE. BREZHNEV WILL SOON HAVE TO DECIDE, HOWEVER, WHAT PRICE HE IS PREPARED TO PAY FOR A SUCCESSFUL VISIT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE CONFLICTING PRESSURES ON HIM.

12. PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNDERDOG-- SOVIET FEAR OF APPEARING WEAK AND ENCOURAGING INCREASED U. S. DEMANDS MAY CREATE PROBLEMS FOR BOTH SIDES.

THERE WILL CERTAINLY BE SOME AMONG SOVIET LEADERSHIP WHO WILL ARGUE THAT: "FURTHER APPEASEMENT" OF ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS IN U. S. WILL ONLY LEAD TO NEW CONTRIVED DEMANDS AND PRESSURE ON THE PRESIDENT; THAT IT IS

TIME FOR U. S. TO DEMONSTRATE BY STANDING UP TO DOMESTIC PRESSURES
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THAT IT CAN BE COUNTED UPON TO PERSIST IN LONG-TERM POLICY OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH USSR. WE SUSPECT BREZHNEV MAY SYMPATHIZE WITH THIS ATTITUDE.

13. SECURITY-- ON SENSITIVE QUESTIONS LIKE EMIGRATION, FREEDOM OF TRAVEL AND INFORMATION AFFECTING INTERNAL CONTROLS, BREZHNEV WILL DOUBTLESS BE CAREFUL TO PROTECT HIS FLANK AGAINST INTERNAL CRITICS. HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO ENCOURAGE U. S. SIDE TO BELIEVE THAT RELAXATION IN INTERNAL SOVIET CONTROLS WILL FOLLOW, BUT CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO PRECEDE PROGRESS IN POLITICAL AND PARTICULARLY ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

14. BREZHNEV POSTURE AT THE SUMMIT-- TO SET THE TONE FOR HIS VISIT, BREZHNEV CAN BE EXPECTED TO GRANT AN INTERVIEW TO U. S. NEWS MEDIUM. HE WILL BE CONCERNED TO PROJECT IMAGE OF DIGNIFIED LEADER OF PROUD, GREAT POWER WHICH SEEKS AMERICA'S FRIENDSHIP-- NOT BECAUSE IT NEEDS CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY (A SORE POINT)-- BUT BECAUSE IT IS IN MUTUAL INTEREST OF TWO WORLD POWERS TO COOPERATE FOR THE COMMON GOOD. HE WILL ALSO STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT U. S. STANDS TO GAIN ECONOMICALLY FROM THIS NEW RELATIONSHIP, AND HE IS LIKELY TO CONSTRUCT ECONOMIC "CASTLES-IN-THE-SKY", AS HE DID IN BONN. HE WILL ENDEAVOR TO LIFT ATTENTION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ABOVE IMMEDIATE AREAS OF DIFFERENCE (E. G., JEWISH EMIGRATION) TO MORE DISTANT HORIZON WHERE COMMING INTERESTS AND MUTUAL BENEFITS MERGE. BREZHNEV CAN BE EXPECTED TO BARGAIN HARD, PARTICULARLY ON DOMESTICALLY SENSITIVE ISSUES, AS HE DID

IN BONN. WHATEVER HIS BLUFF, HOWEVER, HE WILL WANT TO RETURN WITH

CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENTS TO SHOW IN JUSTIFICATION OF ANY CONCESSIONS HE
MAY HAVE MADE. HE WILL HOPE THAT THESE AGREEMENTS WILL SUPPORT HIS
CONTENTION THAT LONG- TERM STABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U. S IS A REAL-
ISTIC OBJECTIVE. FACT THAT POLITBURO/ SUPREME SOVIET/ COUNCIL OF
MINISTER STATEMENT ENDORSING BREZHNEV' S VISIT TO BONN CITED AGREEMENT
WITH U. S. " ON QUESTIONS OF EUR

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